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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is a constituent of four federating units—Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Paktunkhwa and Balochistan. There is a huge difference in the extent and quality of 
public services provision among these provinces. The variation in public service 
provision, that was mainly the result of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has created 
vertical and horizontal imbalances among the provinces, which were further translated 
into the districts of each province.  
In Pakistan, like other developing countries, well defined and constitutionally 
protected intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems are operational. The National Finance 
Commission is a prime arrangement for the distribution of funds among the federal and 
provincial governments. Whereas the Provincial Finance Commission is responsible for 
the distribution of funds among the provincial, districts and sub-district governments. In 
Pakistan the prime responsibility of tax collection lies with the federal government, 
whereas, the responsibilities of the provision of social, economic and community services 
lies with the provincial and districts government.  The purpose of the transfers in Pakistan 
from higher to lower level governments is to bridge the gap between the revenue and 
expenditures and to promote the equitable growth. This will also help reducing poverty 
among the districts. 
The new system of devolution implemented in 2001 has brought several changes 
in the intergovernmental fiscal relationship among the provinces and districts. After 
devolution 2001 the provision of social services and few economic services were 
transferred to the district governments.  This entails and envisages a new and 
comprehensive fiscal relationship between the Province and the Districts. The Provincial 
Finance Commission (PFC), a special feature of the 2001 devolution, announces a three 
year horizon and formula for the distribution of resources which predicts the flow of 
funds to the districts from the province.  
The intergovernmental transfer systems have various objectives. However, the 
fiscal equalisation and redistribution of funds among the different tiers of government are 
the prime objectives of the fiscal transfer. The PFC gives a formula based allocation of 
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funds among the districts to minimise the deprivation among the districts. The PFC deals 
with both vertical inequity—the inequity between the provincial government and districts 
governments—and horizontal inequity—inequities among the districts.  
Since 2001 in each province the two PFC awards have been announced so far, 
first in 2001 and second in 2007. Similarly, attempts were also made to construct 
district wise deprivation index in each province like Social Policy and Development 
Centre (SPDC) in 1998 and in 2005. The Deprivation Index indicates in each district 
of each province the number of people who do not access to basic needs of 
education, health, clean water and housing.  Haroon (2007) constructed deprivation 
index for each district in Pakistan. The selection of indicators is based on the theory 
and district-wise data availability. These include literacy rate and out of School 
children, housing quality and congestion, residential housing services and 
employment status. The gender disparity is incorporated taking these measures 
separately for male and female population. 
The purpose of this paper is to see whether any link can be ascertained between the 
PFC transfer and the deprivation index. The link between the funds transfer and 
deprivation index will indicate whether the funds transfer is pro-poor districts and fiscal 
equaliser or not. 
The paper is organised as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature on the theatrical 
and applied issues of fiscal equalisation. Section 3 gives data collection, methodology 
and results and Section 4 gives the conclusion and policy implication. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There is a rich literature on fiscal federalism both on theoretical and applied 
aspects. Bhal, Boex and Vazquez (2002) discuss the issues of designing of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer. This study mentions the generally accepted reasons 
for intergovernmental fiscal transfer are—improving vertical fiscal imbalances, 
improving the horizontal fiscal balances, compensating for externalities and funding 
for merits goods. Boex (2002) develop allocation formula for Decentralised 
Financing and Development Programme in Nepal. Boex (2002) included relative 
weight of rural population, relative weight of fiscal need and relative weight of 
development in the distributional formula. The paper highlight when there is suspect 
of measurement errors the Human Development Index should not be used as it will 
not be fiscal equaliser. 
Qiao, et al. (2002) using panel data between 1985 and 1998 in China find that 
there is positive relationship exists between the growth and inequality, which implies 
higher growth will lead more inequality. Hofman and Guerra (2002) explain causes and 
consequences of fiscal inequities among sub-national government in East Asia. This 
study using the data of five countries China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet 
Nam reveals that endowment and fiscal capacities among sub-national entities are large 
and reason for larger inequities before equalisation efforts. The study concludes that 
current system of equalisation in East Asia is mildly equaliser and even after such efforts 
the disparity is still large. Yan (2003) concludes that fiscal reforms of 1985 and 1994 
failed to bring any fiscal equalisation. Ahmad and other (2000) conclude that the fiscal 
reforms have increased income distribution.   
Inter-Governmental Funds Flows in Pakistan 705
3.  DATA, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this section we will discuss the results which will show whether the transfers are 
reducing poverty and deprivation at districts level or not? The results also touched upon 
the fiscal equalisation or income inequality among the districts. The “equalisation” or 
“fiscal equalisation” means “the capability of sub-national government to deliver similar 
level of services at similar levels of taxes,” [Searle (2002) and Hofman and Guerra 
(2002)]. 
The data for the study is collected from different sources of Provincial and local 
budget documents. The Provincial development Statistics are used for the data on 
transfers, population and other provincial and districts variables. The government of 
Pakistan website www.gov.pk is also used. The data for 98 districts of Pakistan are 
collected –34 from Punjab, 16 from Sindh, 24 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 24 for 
Balochistan. The deprivation indexes are constructed by SPDC in 1998 and 2005 based 
on District Census Report 1998 and Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement Survey 
2004 www.spdc-pak.com.  
The purpose of the paper is seeing whether the transfer from the provincial 
government to the districts government is fiscal equalisers or not. To answer this question 
this paper uses different statistical results, which we discuss one by one. 
 
Table 1 
Rank Correlation between Deprivation Index and per Capita Grants 
 Rank Correlation 
 2003 2007 
Punjab 0.1804 0.4133 
Sindh –0.0882 0.0382 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa –0.0652 0.4287 
Balochistan –0.2626 –0.36261 
 
The Table 1 (detailed relevant tables are given in the Appendix) gives the Rank 
Correlation between the first ranking on the basis of district deprivation index and the 
second ranking on the basis of per capita transfers to the districts. Table 1 gives two Rank 
Correlations one for 2003 and second for 2007 that indicate inter-temporal changes in the 
nature of transfers. The rank correlation for 2003 are based on the SPDC deprivation 
index 1998 and transfer on the basis of 2001 Provincial Finance Commission award. 
Where as the Rank Correlation of 2007 are based on the deprivation index 2005 and 
transfer on the basis of Provincial Finance Commission award 2007. In the deprivation 
index the most deprived district get rank 1 and least deprived district (most developed) 
gets last rank, where as the per capita transfer ranking is arranged on ascending order i.e. 
the district get maximum per capita transfer gets rank 1 and the district which get 
minimum per capita transfer gets last rank. The value of rank correlation indicates to 
what extent the per capita transfers from provincial government to districts government 
are based on the district deprivation index. If the rank correlation is one it means the 
transfers are completely based on deprivation index and it is most desirable distribution 
system and minus one means most undesirable distribution system.  
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Table 1 gives rank correlation for the districts of Punjab province, which is the 
most developed and populated province of Pakistan. The first rank correlation for 
2003 was 0.1804 which increased to 0, 4132 in 2007. This shows new PFC of Punjab 
government 2007 is more pro poor districts. This implies the per capita transfer has 
increased for those districts which are more deprived in terms of social and 
community services. Similar trend prevail for North West Frontier Province      
(Table 1) where the rank correlation which was –.06512 for 2003 increased to 0.4286 
for 2007. This implies even in this province the new PFC is more pro-poor districts. 
The province Sindh which is the second largest province in terms of   population 
shows both  rank correlations has very little values implies insignificant link between 
the per capita transfer and deprivation level exist. The forth province Balochistan 
which is the largest province in terms of area but smallest in term of population the 
value of the rank correlation was –0.2626 in 2003 and further worsen –0.3626 in 
2007. This implies that in this province the transfer are not based on deprivation 
level of districts and rich province gets higher transfers. This analysis shows in 
Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over time the fiscal transfers are pro poor districts, 
whereas in Balochistan the transfers over time become less pro-poor districts and in 
Sindh it remained neutral.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Equation Analysing the Stability of Deprivation Index 
 Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan Pakistan 
Constant 6.3592 1.34660 6.8723 6.5587 0.0232 
      
t-Values 2.6867 0.23243 1.4253 1.2761 0.0112 
      
BETA 0.7905 0.86409 0.7792 0.8562 0.9057 
      
t-Values 19.7614 9.39948 10.7573 12.2657 28.6506 
      
R-Squire 0.9243 0.86321 0.8403 0.8724 0.8953 
Observations 34 16 24 24 98 
 
This paper also tests the significance of regression coefficient of deprivation 
indices of 2005 and 1998.  To test this significance the dependent variable is new 
deprivation index of 2005 and independent variable is deprivation index of 1998 and an 
intercept. The results of five regressions correspond to Pakistan, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan shows very high and significant regression coefficient      
(Table 2). These results show the coefficients between new and old deprivation indices 
are 0.905, 0.790 and 0.864 for Pakistan, Punjab and Sindh respectively, whereas 0.779 
and 0.856 for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan respectively. The variables in all 
these equations are significant at 95 percent level and shows at-least little changes are 
observed between two indices which imply that fiscal transfers have made little effects on 
deprivation rankings. 
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Table 3 gives province wise district wise summary of per capita transfer and 
deprivation profile for 2003 and 2007. This Table gives value of maximum, minimum 
and average deprived level of districts, the ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation 
and its coefficient of variation.  This Table also gives value of maximum, minimum and 
average per capita transfers to each district, the ratio of maximum to minimum per capita 
transfer and its coefficient of variation. Table 3 indicate inter provincial and intra 
provincial (inter district) deprivation and disparity profile and per capita transfers and 
help us to evaluate whether the fiscal transfer in last few years have reduced deprivation 
and disparity both at inter provincial and intra provincial level. 
 
Table 3 















Per  Capita 
Transfers 
2007 
Punjab Max 74.78 64.91 966.71 1653.29 
 Min 34.34 29.22 425.87 638.85 
 Ave 58.41 52.53 635.65 1098.92 
 Std. dev. 9.62 7.91 130.12 189.21 
 Ratio max/min 2.18 2.22 2.27 2.59 
 Coeff. of Variation 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.17 
Sindh Max 75.44 65.34 1060.88 1728.83 
 Min 24.59 20.94 459.90 669.43 
 Ave 62.03 54.95 772.04 1390.12 
 Std. dev. 11.51 10.71 146.40 260.30 
 Ratio Max/Min 3.07 3.12 2.31 2.58 
 Coeff. of Variation 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Khyber  
Pakhtunkhwa Max 82.96 71.72 1227.56 5431.50 
 Min 50.78 44.24 619.94 389.44 
 Ave 66.17 58.43 796.72 1493.76 
 Std. dev. 7.38 6.27 151.88 1232.37 
 Ratio max/min 1.63 1.62 1.98 13.95 
 Coeff. of Variation 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.83 
Balochistan Max 89.06 82.76 4476.36 5694.92 
 Min 46.00 45.99 444.66 634.87 
 Ave 73.16 69.20 1275.21 1532.92 
 Std. dev. 8.52 7.81 798.41 1012.41 
 Ratio Max/Min 1.94 1.80 10.07 8.97 
 Coeff. of Variation 0.12 0.11 0.63 0.66 
Pakistan Max 89.06 82.76 4476.36 5694.92 
(Overall) Min 24.59 20.94 425.87 389.44 
 Ave 64.51 58.45 853.99 1349.44 
  Std. Dev. 7.95 7.66 255.27 442.25 
  Ratio Max/Min 3.62 3.95 10.51 14.62 
  Coeff. of Variation 0.12 0.13 0.30 0.33 
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This Table 3 shows at overall Pakistan level for 2003 the average per capita 
transfer level among district was 855.9 and increased to 1349.4 in 2007 which implies the 
per capita transfer, on average, have increased in the districts. The level of maximum 
value of transfer was 4476.36 increased to 5694.92 whereas the minimum value of 
transfer decreased from 425.3 to 389.4. The ratio of maximum to minimum transfer has 
increased from 10.51 to 14.62 and coefficient of variation of transfer increased from 
0.2989 to 0.3277. 
This Table 3 also shows at overall Pakistan level for 2003 the average deprived 
level among district was 64.51 but reduced to 58.45 in 2007 which implies the per capita 
transfer, on average, have reduced deprivation in the districts. This Table further shows 
the level of maximum deprived district which had value of 89.06 reduced to 82.76 
whereas the minimum value of deprivation reduced from 24.59 to 20.59. However, the 
Table 3 shows that these fiscal transfers fail to reduce deprivation disparity, in fact, it has 
worsened it. The ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation has increased from 3.62 to 
3.95 and coefficient of variation of deprivation increased from 0.123 to 0.131. 
The analysis of per capita transfers and deprivation index for overall Pakistan 
show very clear trends. The per capita transfer has increased and average deprivation has 
decreased. The figures also show the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer increased 
and consequently the ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation has also increased. The 
figures also indicate the movement in the coefficient of variations in the transfers and the 
deprivation indices are in the same direction and increasing. 
As for as the province wise changes in the per capita transfer and the deprivation 
levels are concerned, all four provinces also gives similar trends. In Punjab which is the 
largest populated province, the average deprivation level declined from 58.41 to 52.53 as a 
result of increase in average per capita transfer from 635.65 to 1098.92. The Punjab results 
show the extreme inequality in deprivation increases as indicated by the increase in the ratio 
of maximum to minimum transfer and maximum to minimum deprivation. However, the 
coefficient of variation of both per capita transfer and deprivation has decreased over time. 
This explains the inequality at average level has decreased over time.  
The least populated but area wise largest province, Balochistan, show the average 
level deprivation has decreased from 73.16 to 69.20 as a result of average increase in per 
capita transfer from 1275.21 to 1532.92. The results also show the reduction in 
deprivation inequality but this can partially be explained by the ratio of maximum to 
minimum transfers.  
The average decline in deprivation in other two provinces Sindh and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa from 62.03 to 54.95 and 66.17 to 58.43 respectively can be explained by 
the average increase in transfers both in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The extreme 
deprivation inequality in Sindh has increased overtime and can be explained both by the 
increasing ratio of maximum to minimum transfer.  However, the inequality in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa did not change despite a very high increase in the ratio of maximum to 
minimum transfer and coefficient of variation in the transfers. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
There are several results of the study based on several statistical analyses. First, the 
analysis based on rank correlation shows in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over time 
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the fiscal transfers are pro poor districts, whereas in Balochistan the transfers over time 
become less pro-poor districts and in Sindh it remained neutral. Second, there is 
significant increase in per capita transfers in all districts of Pakistan. These increases are 
due to increase in economic growth more than 6 per cent GDP growth for the last few 
years and special recognition of the devolution phenomenon in last several years. Third, 
deprivation has decreased almost in all districts in last few years because of significant 
increase in per capita transfers.   
Fourth, the results of the study shows the deprivation inequalities have not reduced 
as a result of increase in fiscal transfers. In fact, in most of the cases, the deprivation 
inequalities have been increased. One, because the per capita increase to the least 
deprived districts equivalently the developed districts are much more than the per capita 
increase to more deprived districts. Two, per unit cost of service delivery is much higher 
in those districts which are very large in area and in those districts where infrastructure is 
weak and perhaps these aspects are ignored in the designing of transfers. Three, the own 
revenues as percentage of transfers are much less in most deprived districts compare to 
least deprived districts and the capability of using available funds is also more in least 
deprived districts. Four, the least deprived districts which are rich districts are also 
politically very strong districts. They can also in position to attract parallel funding from 
the higher level government and borrowing from the foreign donors. Fifth, reason that 
can be given why the deprivation has decreased but disparity did not, is the deliberate 
effort and perception of the government to take steps to improve deprivation situation 
first and then income distribution aspect will be taken into consideration.  




Rank Correlation Data for Punjab 
Districts 












Attock 12 26 7 25 
Bahawalnagar 5 11 10 15 
Bahwalpur 25 9 23 8 
Bhakkar 3 6 2 14 
Chakwal 1 21 3 27 
D.G. Khan 14 3 9 5 
Faisalabad 33 30 29 29 
Gujranwala 26 31 30 33 
Gujrat 20 29 28 30 
Hafizabad 2 20 16 19 
Jhang 18 10 20 10 
Jhelum 6 28 11 26 
Kasur 28 19 25 21 
Khanewal 22 12 19 11 
Khushab 4 16 4 13 
Lahore 34 34 32 34 
Layyah 9 4 6 4 
Lodhran 32 5 14 1 
M.B.Din 21 23 22 23 
Mianwali 11 13 5 16 
Multan 31 22 27 20 
Muzaffargarh 30 2 24 2 
Narowal 8 24 8 22 
Okara 24 15 1 12 
Pakpattan 29 7 17 6 
R.Y. Khan 10 8 26 7 
Rajanpur 13 1 13 3 
Rawalpindi 23 32 33 31 
Sahiwal 15 17 18 18 
Sargodha 16 18 12 17 
Sheikhpura 27 25 34 28 
Sialkot 19 33 31 32 
T. T.  Singh 17 27 15 24 
Vehari 7 14 21 9 
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Table A2 
Rank Correlation Data for Sindh 
Districts 
Rank 













Badin 9 3 12 5 
Dadu 8 9 7 3 
Ghotki 13 5 14 11 
Hyderabad 10 15 4 14 
Jacobabad 15 4 1 6 
Karachi City 16 16 16 16 
Khairpur 4 10 10 8 
Larkana 12 13 11 4 
Mirpurkhas 11 6 15 10 
Nausheroferoze 6 12 3 12 
Nawabshah 7 11 13 9 
Sanghar 5 7 9 7 
Shikarpur 2 8 6 13 
Sukkur 1 14 2 15 
Thar At Mithi 14 1 5 2 
Thatta 3 2 8 1 
 
Table A3 
















Abbottabad 6 22 22 10 
Bannu 12 18 20 12 
Battagram 10 3 2 13 
Buner 19 5 6 15 
Charsadda 23 14 11 14 
Chitral 1 7 3 5 
D.I.Khan 4 9 15 11 
Hangu 15 6 9 3 
Haripur 3 23 23 18 
Karak 2 13 8 4 
Kohat 5 19 16 21 
Kohistan 16 1 1 8 
Lakki Marwat 9 17 14 7 
Lower Dir 11 10 17 22 
Malakand Agency 8 15 12 9 
Mansehra 13 12 10 20 
Mardan 22 20 18 16 
Nowshehra 14 21 21 6 
Peshawar 24 24 24 23 
Shangla 17 2 5 2 
Swabi 20 16 19 24 
Swat 18 11 13 17 
Tank 7 8 7 1 
Upper Dir 21 4 4 19 
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Table A4 
















Awaran 9 3 9 2 
Barkhan 5 8 5 11 
Bolan 17 12 18 13 
Chagai 24 14 24 10 
Gwadar 16 20 16 18 
Jafarabad 19 16 20 22 
Jhal Magsi 6 5 6 7 
Kalat 13 18 11 20 
Kech(Turbat) 12 19 12 12 
Kharan 7 2 22 3 
Khuzdar 15 7 14 9 
Killa Abdullah 23 11 23 8 
Killa Saifullah 10 10 10 5 
Lasbela 18 15 15 16 
Loralai 8 17 8 17 
Mastung 4 13 4 14 
Musa Khail 20 1 17 1 
Nasirabad 22 9 21 15 
Panjgur 21 6 19 6 
Pishin 3 22 3 23 
Quetta 11 24 7 24 
Sibi 2 21 2 19 
Zhob 14 4 13 4 
Ziarat 1 23 1 21 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, and Li Keping, and Thomas Richardson (2000) Recentralisation in 
China? Conference on Fiscal Decentralisation. 
Ahmed, Qazi Masood (1997) The Issues in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationship in 
Developing Countries. Review of FAO (1998) Rome Italy. Earlier this Paper was 
presented at the Conference on the ‘Technical Consultations on Decentralisation’ in 
Rome, December 16-18.  
Bahl, Roy, Jamie Boex, and Marknez-vazquez (2002) The Design and Implementation of 
Fiscal Transfer. Fiscal Decentralisation Workshop in Nepal. 
Boex, Jamie (2002)  Developing an Allocation Formula for the Decentralised Financing 
and Development Programme and Implication for the Design of a System of 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation in Nepal.   
Inter-Governmental Funds Flows in Pakistan 713
Hofman, Bert, and Su sana Cordeira Guerra (2002)  Ensuring Inter-reginal Equity and 
Poverty Reduction. World Bank Report. 
Jamal, Haroon (2005) Mapping the Spatial Deprivation of Pakistan.  The Pakistan 
Development Review 42:2 
Jamal, Haroon and Amir Jehan Khan (2007) Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2005. 
(SPDC Research Report No. 72).   
Pakistan Government of (Various Issues) Pakistan Economic Survey. Islamabad: Finance 
Division. 
Pakistan, Government of (Various Issues) Provincial Finance Statistics.  
Qiao, Baoyum, Jorge Martinnez-Vazquez, and Yongsheng Xu (2003) Growth and Equity 
Trade-off in Decentralisation Policy : China’s Experience. Georgia State University. 
Rao, M. Govinda (2001) Challenges in Fiscal Decentralisation: An Asian Perspective. 
Paper presented at Public Finance in Developing and Transitional Countries. Atlanta, 
Georgia. 
Rao, M. Govinda, Richard M. Birds, and Jennie Litvack (2001) Fiscal Decentralisation 
and Poverty Alleviation in a Transitional Economies: A Case of Veit Nam.  Asian 
Economic Journal. 
Searle, Bob (2002) Federal Fiscal Relations in Australia. International Centre for 
Economic Research. Torino, Italy  








The authors have made a good attempt to examine whether there is any link 
between the inter-governmental fiscal transfers and the deprivation index in the districts 
of Pakistan.  The authors have used the data for this study which was collected from 98 
districts of four provinces of Pakistan for 2003 and 2007. 
Although text is very well written but there are some repetitions. At some place 
authors merely replaced the variable and used the same sentence while presenting results 
of the next variable. 
Secondly, I would like to comment that while presenting disparities using different 
measures for deprivation and fiscal transfers in Table 3, authors have got contradictory 
results. For example, in Punjab according to ratio of maximum/minimum, disparities in 
deprivation and fiscal transfers have increased while according to coefficient of variation 
disparity has declined. Similar is the case with Sindh and Balochistan where both of these 
indicators gave contradictory results. 
This is mainly because of the fact that coefficient of variation do not satisfy the 
transfer-sensitivity property. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer requires that 
whenever a unit of income is transferred from a richer person to a poorer person and such 
a does not reverse the ranking of two individuals, the inequality index should decline.  
The Coefficient of Variation is more sensitive to upper part than other part of the 
distribution and therefore it may give misleading results. The well know Gini coefficient 
satisfy the principle of transfer sensitivity. It is, therefore, important to use Gini 
coefficient to resolve this issue to some extent. 
Thirdly, the authors results that the transfers have reduced deprivation across the 
board but unable to solve disparity issue are in line with the trends in reducing 
deprivation in term of absolute poverty but increasing inequality. Finally, while authors 
have summarised the result in conclusions, some policy recommendations should be 
given in discussion.  
   
Talat Anwar 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
Programme Support Unit, Islamabad. 
